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Abstract
International migration has been a major influence on the economic and social develop-
ment of nations. Nevertheless, a vast majority of the global population continues to re-
side in their country of birth. While income/wealth differentials between states create 
centrifugal forces responsible for migration, impediments to international mobility of 
human, financial, physical and social capital assets work in the centripetal direction. This 
paper reviews a large segment of the extant literature on international migration to probe 
economic influences on people’s international mobility and immobility decisions. It aims 
to refine and extend the neoclassical foundations of migration theory and to outline how 
potentially complex decision mechanisms used by potentially mobile economic agents 
may be modified to simplify the complexity inherent in such choices so that immobility 
is often a default outcome of indecision.
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Międzynarodowa mobilność i formowanie bogactwa 
przez agentów ekonomicznych: w kierunku eklektycznych 
ram wspierających decyzje migracyjne
Migracja międzynarodowa miała istotny wpływ na społeczny i gospodarczy rozwój na-
rodów. Zdecydowana większość populacji świata nadal jednak mieszka w kraju swojego 
urodzenia. Z jednej strony różnice w dochodach i zamożności państw stanowią siłę od-
środkową motywującą do migracji, z drugiej strony utrudnienia w swobodnym prze-
noszeniu się kapitału ludzkiego, finansowego, fizycznego jak i społecznego stanowią siłę 
dośrodkową, motywującą do pozostania w miejscu. W niniejszym artykule dokonano 
przeglądu znacznej części literatury na temat migracji międzynarodowej pod kątem 
wpływu czynników ekonomicznych na decyzje dotyczące międzynawowej mobilności 
i jej braku. Artykuł ma na celu udoskonalenie i rozszerzenie neoklasycznych podstaw 
teorii migracji, nakreślenie, w jaki sposób ekonomiczni agenci (potencjalni migranci) 
starają się uprościć skomplikowane mechanizmy decyzyjne oraz pokazanie, jak w przy-
padku niezdecydowania domyślną decyzją staje się pozostanie w miejscu.
Persistent economic and demographic asymmetries between nation states have 
been powerful generators of cross-border movements of people and this is likely 
to continue in the foreseeable future (UN, 2015). The proportion of international 
migrants, defined as foreign-born persons residing temporarily or permanently 
in-country, accounts for nearly 3.5 percent of the world’s population (244 million 
people in 2015; UN, 2016: 21). Between 2000 and 2015, high-income countries 
received a net average of about four million immigrants annually from lower- and 
middle-income countries (UN, 2015). Not only do traditional immigrant destinations, 
such Australia or Canada, but also countries that not so long ago were sources of 
emigration, such as Ireland, now have a foreign-born population exceeding ten percent 
of the total (OECD, 2017). It is increasingly apparent that international migration 
is likely to remain as ubiquitous this century as it has been for the past 150 years.
There has long been a tendency in the economic literature to treat this cross-border 
migration as primarily the movement of wage-earners seeking to take advantage of 
wage differentials and variations in employment conditions which persist between 
different national and regional segments of the global economy (see Zimmermann 
and Bauer, 2002, Vol. 1, Part I; Constant and Zimmermann, 2013: Parts I and II). As 
the Nobel Prize laureate Sir John Hicks observed, it is “differences in net economic 
advantages, chiefly differences in wages (that) are the main causes of migration” 
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(Hicks, 1932). The international migration has, therefore, been seen as an outcome 
of efficient labour market arbitrage, which redirects workers from low- to high-wage 
destinations and from areas of un-/under-employment to job-rich locations.
However, given large income differences between countries comprising the poor 
South and the rich North, the 3.5 percent share of foreign-born people in the global 
population appears to be rather small. Notwithstanding the recent surge in migrant 
numbers crossing the Mediterranean and the presence of millions of ‘illegal’ immi-
grants in the USA, an obvious question an economist would like to ask is not ‘why 
so many have migrated?’ but ‘why only so few?’
An obvious response to this question attributes the apparent spatial immobility of 
people to a plethora of border controls and restrictions on inflows of migrants, which 
have been imposed by high-income nations and impediments faced by poor and 
relatively unskilled job seekers from the South in labour-importing countries of the 
North. Thus, only a small proportion of those willing to move have actually been able 
to migrate. The proponents of the unimpeded factor-mobility (e.g.,  Clements, 2011) 
have, therefore, argued that there are massive potential gains to be realised from 
easing these wealth-diminishing migration restrictions.3 Borjas (2015) effectively 
debunks such idealistic calls for nation-states to abolish border controls and allow 
unimpeded flows of migrants: if “billions” rather than tens of millions of people 
moved from the South to the North, there would be prohibitive migrant absorption 
costs, which the North would have to bear and the resultant net gain for the global 
economy would most likely be negative.
Moreover, to attribute the entire observed human immobility to the presence 
of border controls and migration restrictions is somewhat simplistic. For example, 
in developed economies, unemployed or underpaid workers are often reluctant 
or unable to move to job-rich and higher-wage locations, even though there are 
no administrative barriers to relocation.4 Similarly, to understand the drivers of 
cross-border migration we need to learn more about location preferences of those 
who have not moved as well as those who have voted with their feet. Any holistic 
theory of international migration cannot be limited to explanations of the observed 
3 As they argue, if ‘billions’ of workers could move from the poor South to the prosperous North the 
global economic gain could amount to ‘hundreds of trillions of dollars’ (Clemens, 2011). This sentiment 
was first captured in Mancur Olson’s metaphor of big (trillion-dollar) bills left lying on the global sidewalk 
ready to be picked up by the world at large if only the Northern policymakers were willing to remove the 
migration restrictions impeding global wealth creation (Olson, 1996).
4 This is most apparent in the European Union (EU), where the post 2004 new member-state accession 
from the poorer eastern and south-eastern parts of Europe produced an initial surge in the East-West 
and South-North migration, which has since subsided even though income/age differentials between 
different parts of the EU are still substantial (OECD, 2019).
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migrant flows but should also probe reasons why so many people opt to remain 
in situ. Thus, theories of human location should not only explain the centrifugal 
forces resulting in people’s mobility, but also the centripetal ones affecting their 
immobility (Arango, 2000). While wage and income differentials are quintessential 
centrifugal drivers of migration flows, family and community commitments, senti-
ments, homeland attachments, endowments of land, physical and social capital often 
generate the force of gravity that keeps people in situ. The theory should, therefore, 
shift the emphasis of the inquiry from the homo migrantes – agents who have exer-
cised their option to move – to the homo economicus or oeconomico (we use these 
terms interchangeably): the ubiquitous economic agent who may move and become 
a homo migantes in some circumstances but who often prefers to remain in situ and 
disregard apparent opportunities offered by alternative locations.
A collection of concepts that define and explain the nature of economising 
decisions, including the choice of location, and the associated economical use of 
scarce resources by oeconomicos is usually described as the neoclassical economic 
paradigm (see Weintraub, 2007). It is the conceptual foundation of all studies of 
economic activity, including economically motivated migrations. Using this con-
ceptual meta-theoretical framework, specific economic theories can be developed 
to address four fundamental questions that capture the essence of the economist’s 
interest in international migrations:
• What factors determine the direction, size and composition of inter-jurisdictional 
migrant flows?
• What decision-support tools could be applied by economic agents to evaluate 
their locational alternatives and to determine their preferred host jurisdictions?
• How do movers detach from their home location and assimilate/integrate into 
their host locations?
• What is the impact of migration on the economies of the sending and receiv-
ing countries/jurisdictions?
A recent example of a specific theory of temporary migrations embedded in the 
meta-theoretical framework of neoclassical economics is Dustmann and Görlach (2016).
The aim of the present paper is to outline the multitude of influences, which may 
affect such decisions to move or stay. We argue that informed relocation decisions 
are inherently complex, risky and costly and, thus, the default position in such com-
plex choices for risk-averse and boundedly rational oeconomic hominum is to defer 
the relocation decision or reject it. Therefore, the force of gravity that keeps people 
in situ is not only related to their sentimental and social attachments, natural inertia, 
or legal barriers, but it is also inherent in the sheer complexity of rational relocation 
decisions: ‘if confused or in doubt, stay put’. The paper reviews the economics-based 
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decision-support framework, which the oeconomicos might use in their spatial and 
intertemporal choices as boundedly-rational decision makers. It is outlined how these 
agents could apply economic principles to optimise their spatial and intertemporal 
decisions as individuals or as members of collective decision-making entities (e.g., 
households, families or communities).
In short, the paper aims to embed spatial relocation decisions in the broader 
process of human economic activity and wealth creation, where spatial mobility of 
human capital is only one, albeit a very important one, outcome of resource alloca-
tion. In this context, we are interested in:
(1) the international mobility/immobility of human capital, which cannot be physi-
cally separated from its human ‘carriers’;
(2) other forms of capital (assets net of offsetting liabilities) that comprise the oecono-
micos’ total wealth; and, thus,
(3) how these boundedly rational agents attribute ‘value’ to and choose between 
different locational options under conditions of uncertainty if they wish to take 
into account the impact of potential relocation on the value of their human and 
other capital assets.
To address the latter question, Section 2 reviews the neoclassical foundations of 
mobility-immobility of individual oeconomicos; Section 3 addresses the decision-mak-
ing mechanics of collective decision entities; Section 4 looks at the diversity of capital 
assets and the mechanics of value attribution in spatial decisions of economic agents; 
and Section 5 draws some concluding inferences.
Individual decision maker: the neoclassical perspective
Neoclassical paradigm
The neoclassical paradigm assumes that people who engage in production and 
consumption of goods and services and who invest in new (production) capability 
formation to enhance their future wellbeing use scarce resources that necessitate 
their efficient and effective (i.e., economical) utilisation. This motivation to engage 
in efficient and effective resource allocation and use is described metaphorically as 
the utility maximisation objective.5 People who care about the economical use of their 
scarce resources and who, therefore, strive to enhance their wellbeing by seeking best 
opportunities for efficient use of these resources are referred to as economic agents (the 
5 See Dasgupta (1990) for a deep discussion of the concept of utility maximisation.
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neoclassical oeconomic hominum). When they choose to migrate to another location 
to enhance their wellbeing, we describe them as economic migrants.
In a market economy, locational and intertemporal decisions of oeconomic 
hominum are ‘market-mediated’. There is a plethora of international and national 
economic institutions, such as formal and informal markets, market intermediaries 
and supporting organisations that assist them in learning about attributes of different 
locations, opportunities for engaging in economic activities at these places and the 
associated options to move or remain. If these institutions are efficient, economic 
agents are non-randomly sorted across different points in space and over time. Thus,
“An important contribution of economic theory is to describe the kind of 
equilibrium sorting that takes place in this marketplace” … given … “ (…) the 
twin assumptions characterizing neoclassical economic theory, i.e., individuals 
are maximizing their well-being and the [market-mediated] exchanges among 
the various players lead to an equilibrium in the marketplace.” … “Economic 
theory, therefore, leads to unique predictions regarding the types of selection 
that characterize immigrant flows, the adaptation or assimilation experienced by 
different immigrants and the impact of these immigrants on the host country” 
(Borjas, 1989: 461, 482).
The neoclassical perspective on economically-motivated international migration 
assumes that the utility maximising oeconomicos evaluate potential locations across 
the global activity space, which is physically and institutionally segmented into 
nation-states (jurisdictions). This segmentation creates impediments restricting agents’ 
entry, exit, work and settlement opportunities and imposes the associated mobility 
costs. The global activity space is also heterogeneous in that national jurisdictions 
differ in their attributes and attractiveness to different oeconomic hominum. In this 
highly heterogeneous environment, an agent currently residing at a particular base 
location may scan and evaluate other accessible locations to determine net benefits 
of moving there (options to migrate) relatively to the attractor value of their current 
location (option to remain). They should then choose the option that maximizes their 
well-being given their resource endowments, which largely determine the desirability 
and spatial reach of potential relocation and institutional constraints, which determine 
the feasibility of moving to different destinations. Migration is, thus, a means to an 
end (a secondary or a derived activity): an enabling investment in spatial mobility 
needed to move to more attractive, accessible locations.
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The Sjaastad cost-benefit model
In an early application of the neoclassical paradigm, Sjaastad (1962) adopted the 
human capital model to show how economic agents may engage in welfare-enhanc-
ing activities at alternative locations by identifying options to migrate/remain and 
assessing potential destinations in terms of relative returns to the available human 
capital; controlling for the cost of spatial mobility and impediments restricting free 
factor movements between jurisdictions (Bodvarsson and Van den Berg, 2009: 27).6
We present Sjaastad’s approach as a simple, formal cost-benefit model in which 
economic agents are endowed with quanta of human capital and calculate returns 
available at different accessible destinations relative to the rate of return obtainable 
at the base location net of transaction costs of spatial relocation. Under conditions of 
perfect knowledge, the rational oeconomicos select their preferred destination as the 
one that offers the largest net present value of their lifetime earnings from the use of 
their human capital endowments. If a particular destination offers more ‘value’ than 
that provided by the base location, the agent may opt to migrate to take advantage 
of the apparent opportunity.
The simple deterministic model is explicitly concerned with a ‘single-shot’ migra-
tion opportunity, whereby an oeconomico engages in pairwise comparisons of poten-
tial locations for their capital endowment. The anticipated gains from moving the 
capital from its home/base location, H, to a potential host (foreign) destination, F, 
must exceed the costs of the move. In each pairwise comparison, the agent calculates 
the net present value of operating at H and F (ΠH and ΠF) to determine the net gain 
of relocation from H to F, ΠFH. A similar calculation is performed for each destina-
tion F belonging to φ0, which is a set of all potential host destinations assessed at 




















−CFH0 d ,  X( ),     F,  H ∈ φ0  (1)
 ΠFH = ΠF − ΠH −  CFH0 d ,  X( ),       F,  H ∈ φ0, (2)
6 Some scholars, e.g. Becker (1975), view migration not only as a means of realising different returns 
on a particular quantum of human capital but also as an enabling investment allowing the oeconomicos 
to enhance their amount of human capital through subsequent location-specific education, training or 
health care, as these capital enhancement opportunities are distributed differently across activity space.
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where t stretches from t = 0 to t = T and t = 1, 2,…T. Returns on capital realised, at 
time t, at the host location F and at the home location H are RFt and RHt,  respectively.7 
The agent’s time preference rate is i and 1/(1+i)t is the associated discount factor. 
Similarly, CFt and CHt are the costs (of capital use) at locations F and H at time t (e.g. 
this could be interpreted as the location-specific cost of living). The cost of migrating 
from H to F at time t = 0 is shown as CFH0(d, X). It increases with d: the distance 
between F and H; and with X a vector of other impedance factors. The difference 
in returns to be realised by migrating from H to F may also be zero or negative. The 
utility maximising agent would use the cost-benefit equation (1) to short-list all 
destinations which offer positive prospects of wealth gain, ΠFH ≥ 0, to select the best 
wealth-enhancing opportunity and, thus, the preferred destination max
F, H∈ Φ0
ΠFH . If this 
option to move is exercised, the oeconomico morphs into the homo migrantes. On 
the other hand, if the best available option offers no net gain from relocating their 
human capital, max
F, H∈ Φ0
ΠFH ≤ 0 , the agent opts to remain at H.
In the model, the oeconomicos consider four dimensions of potential locations 
for their human capital endowment:
• the spatial dispersion of rates of return to human capital across different acces-
sible destinations;
• the spatial dispersion of costs of using that capital at different destinations;
• the time profile of economic returns, Rt, and costs, Ct, at each location, which 
need to be discounted to a particular base date (say t=0) using the appropriate 
discount factor (1/(1+i)t) and summed up over the activity’s lifespan of T time 
periods; and
• their rate of time preference (time value of human capital), i.
As the oeconomicos differ in their individual characteristics and capital endow-
ments, variables included in the model may be aggregated differently by different 
people. Also, the oeconomicos may include different factors in their assessments of 
mobility/immobility prospects. Thus, to assert how particular agents actually assess 
their mobility options we would need agent-specific information on their choice 
of decision variables, the associated physical quantities, imputed values (actual or 
shadow prices) and the basis of agent-specific aggregation. In effect, the relative 
attractiveness of different locations is refracted through individual characteristics 
and preferences of different agents.
7 In a simple case, the gross return on human capital can be envisaged as a wage income over the 
lifetime of residence at a particular location.
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The pecuniary cost-benefit model can also be re-specified to compare utilities 
assigned to different locations by the decision-maker:
 U F( )  =U RF ,CF ,  T ,  i,  CFH0( ),           F ∈ φ0 ,  (3)
where RF   = (RF0 ,  …,  RFT ) and CF   = (CF0 ,  …,  CFT ) . The U (F) is the representative 
agent’s non-decreasing and quasi-concave utility function and the agents choose 
to move to a location that maximizes their utility. The foreign location is at a disad-
vantage since the cost of moving rarely equals zero for locations other than home:
 U H( )  =U RH,CH ,  T ,  i,  0( ),                H ∈ φ0 . (4)
The agent’s utility perspective makes the model more general and flexible, allowing 
it to incorporate additional decisional dimensions and cost-benefit values. However, 
as this gain in flexibility is partially offset by less precise predictions, we have included 
the more specific Sjasstad-style model (1) together with the more general, utility 
optimising representation (3).
Uncertainty and expected utility
Several writers have refined Sjastaad’s model by introducing probabilities of alter-
native cost-benefit scenarios (see in particular Todaro 1969; Harris and Todaro 1970; 
Corden and Findlay 1975). Let pFt denote the probability of realising the net returns 
to human capital at time t at location F and pHt at location H. Thus, pFt (RFt − CFt) and 
 pHt (RHt − CHt) are the expected net returns to human capital at F and H, respectively, 
at time t and the difference between location-specific expected streams of returns is 
the expected net gain from moving the quantum of human capital from H to F. The 
oeconomico will only become the homo migrantes if the expected net gain from exer-
cising an option to move from the current home location H to the best alternative 
destination F is positive: max
F, H∈ Φ0
E ΠFH( )> 0
 E(ΠFH )=  
t=0
t=T













−CFH0 d ,  X( ),     F,  H ∈ φ0      
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−CFH0 d ,  X( ),     F,  H ∈ φ0      (5)
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This approach could be further refined by taking into consideration job search 
costs, periods of un- or under-employment of human capital at different locations, 
random match effects, planned return migration, and so on. All such cost items could 
be assigned particular probabilities of their occurrence, as above, or more generally 
as random variables that have different possible outcomes.
Probabilities of different returns on capital at different locations may also be 
incorporated into the more general utility model to take into account agents’ different 
attitudes to risk and methods of aggregation:
 U F( )  =  U pF ,RF ,CF ,  T ,  i,  CFH0( ),    F∈ φ0 , (6)
where pF is the vector ( pF0 ,  …,  pFT ). In general, the attributes of home location have 
significant bearing on the agent’s choices. For example, people located at ‘home’, 
H= F∈ φ0, are often much better informed about returns to their human capital 
and the associated risks at that location. Also, those who have no appetite for risky 
re-locations are more likely to remain in situ. It is, therefore, likely that people’s loca-
tional preferences are path-dependent. The basic model of the representative agent’s 
spatial mobility-immobility choices ignores such autoregressive aspects of decision 
making. Additionally, exercising an option to migrate is treated implicitly as a single 
shot decision, i.e., at the decision time t=0 the agents consider streams of benefits 
and costs over timeframe [0, T] but they only migrate once, although this could be 
an intended temporary migration (as discussed by Dustmann and Görlach 2016).
Polachek and Horvath (2012) modified the single-shot migration model of Sjaastad 
to represent migration as an outcome of the continuous investment process stretching 
over the entire life cycle of the perspicacious peregrinator who periodically evaluates 
the attractiveness of different locations in terms of economic conditions (employment 
prospects, industrial structures, wage and price levels) and access to public goods 
and amenities. Thus, economic agents remain perennially footloose and could move 
repeatedly if and when new locations become more attractive (see also a model of 
sequential in-country migrations driven by expected income differentials in different 
locations in Kennan and Walker, 2011). Pickles and Rogerson (1984) and McCall 
and McCall (1987) have explored the concept of periodic and chain-like migration 
decisions where the net income maximising migrant evaluates different destinations 
periodically to move to a higher value location. Hatton and Williamson (2005) and 
Clark, Hatton and Williamson (2007) have focused more specifically on the cost of 
moving migrant human capital.
Borjas (1987, 1989, 1991, 1994) extended Sjaastad’s model as well as that of Harris 
and Todaro (1970) to broaden the concept of expected income differentials between 
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locations. In his model, human capital investors must consider the expected income 
streams, net of migration costs, at different potential destinations and factor in the 
likely depreciation (or appreciation) of their human capital endowments (such as 
the transferability of their skills or educational attainments) as they move across 
borders. That is demands for different skills vary between locations and the value of 
skills may appreciate or depreciate as people move between jurisdictions. For any 
given human capital endowment, opportunities for realising its potential also differ 
between destinations and some of these differences could be attributed to observ-
able characteristics of these areas (e.g., differences in average earnings or different 
earning distributions), while others are influenced by attributes that are not directly 
observable (e.g., chance factors that determine who does well and who does poorly at 
each location). Thus, mobility decisions and the selectivity of migrant flows depend 
on how different components of human capital are expected to appreciate/depreciate 
as migrants cross borders, that is, on the inherent spatial transferability of human 
capital and on the oeconomico’s appetite for risk (see also Massey et al., 1993, 2008). 
Dustmann and Görlach (2016) provide a comprehensive framework for analysing 
temporariness in the spatial reallocation of human capital, which endogenizes the 
duration of stay at different locations and, thus, allows for intended and unintended 
temporary/return migrations, seasonal, repeat and circulatory mobility, and so on.
Finally, in our individual decision-making framework, it is assumed implicitly that 
the agent is endowed with a quantum of human capital that is used as a fixed quantity 
irrespective of where it is deployed. This assumption of capital lumpiness needs to be 
revisited as the location-specific return per unit of capital may influence how much 
of it is used at any given location. We revisit this problem in the following section.
Collective decision making
New Economics of Labour Migration
Building on the earlier work of Becker (1974, 1975), Polachek and Horvath (2012) 
and Mincer (1978), sophisticated models of collective decision-making have been 
developed by the New Economics of Labour Migration (NELM) (Stark and Bloom, 
1985; Stark, 1991) to facilitate more realistic representations of migration-related 
decision processes that incorporate collective decisions by households, extended 
families, clans, or local communities. For example, a family may club together to pay 
for the education of its potentially mobile members to increase their human capi-
tal endowments and to assist them in moving to higher-income destinations. This 
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collective investment may be subsequently ‘repaid’ when a sponsored individual 
remits part of their income or acts as a sponsor for other family members (Stark, 
2009). Thus, migration of some family members combined with migrant remittances 
may provide a means of family income and consumption smoothing and risk man-
agement (Stark and Levhari, 1982; Rosenzweig, 1988; Rosenzweig and Stark, 1989; 
Chen and Chiang, 1998; Foster and Rosenzweig, 2001; Cox and Jimenez, 1992; Cox 
et al., 1998; Poirine, 1997).
The NELM framework can also be used to model a wide range of relationships 
between members of families and the associated intra- and inter-generational transfers 
of capital assets within various collective entities. Migrant earnings may be remitted 
back home to assist those left behind, to acquire assets such as land and property, 
secure the remitter’s preferential claim on family inheritance, arrange an advanta-
geous marriage, or climb the seniority ladder in the home community (Massey et 
al., 2008). The collective decision paradigm shifts the institutional emphasis from 
market-mediated to non-market allocative processes, i.e. those that take place within 
families or communities.8 These non-market transactions are based on incomplete, 
quasi-contractual arrangements between individuals and their families or communities 
and, thus, they rely on informal contract enforcement mechanisms the effectiveness 
of which depends on prevailing social norms, opportunities for social exclusion, or 
the threat of ostracism.
The NELM approach also allows the collectively-owned wealth to be represented 
as portfolios of assets jointly owned and managed by family members. Thus, a family 
may engage in portfolio diversification to mitigate risks posed by excessive depend-
ence on income derived from a particular activity such as traditional subsistence 
farming. As Rapoport and Docquier (2006: 1150) note, “in a context of imperfect 
capital markets, remittances may be part of an implicit migration contract between 
the migrant and his or her family, allowing the familial entity to access to higher 
and/or less volatile incomes”.9 Similarly, expatriate members of the collective may 
also return home to mitigate risks of various adversities and to take advantage of 
the intra-family welfare support. Thus, the diversification of family capital assets 
8 Market imperfections or the absence of mature capital and insurance markets in developing 
countries may prevent/impede market-mediated risk management and the collective entity managing 
the portfolio of family assets has to rely on intra-collective activity diversification to increase the mean 
value and reduce the variance of returns.
9 For example, while some family members are assigned to work in the traditional family business 
at their home location, others are dispatched abroad to engage in activities characterised by different 
risk-return profiles with a proportion of total income from all activities consolidated by the collective 
entity to support those family members engaged in less rewarding activities as well as to provide insurance 
against catastrophic events such as droughts, business downturns or outbreaks of hostilities.
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through migration becomes a quasi-contractual mechanism of risk mitigation to be 
used when markets are imperfect or absent and where mechanisms of social/welfare 
support do not allow for market-mediated risk transfers and hedging (Stark, 1991, 
2009; Dustmann, 1997; De Jong et al., 1996; De Jong, 2000).
Collective decision-making framework
Providing that the collective capital management decision involves consideration 
of repositioning a quantum of human capital between the initial home location, H, 
and a potential destination, F, the cost-benefit evaluation equation (5) may be used 
by the collective entity as a decision support tool if the size of a collective entity and 
the rules governing the distribution of returns remain invariant regardless of where 
that capital is used. Similarly, the canonical utility equation (6) may also be used 
when the collective entity maximises its joint utility in a manner similar to a natural 
individual maximising their total utility.
However, since the spatial repositioning of a quantum of human capital by the 
collective entity may also involve the spatial repositioning of a person(s) in whom 
that capital is embedded, the collective entity should not mimic individual total util-
ity maximisers. Members may increase or decrease their utility by sharing locations 
with other community members. Additionally, in most collective entities, individual 
members are free to leave the collective, taking their human capital with them and 
new members may be allowed to join the collective. Thus, considerations of the group 
size and governance arrangements, which determine the nature of mutual dependency 
between its members, are critical in determining the spatial allocation of the entity’s 
human capital and, thus, the spatial mobility-immobility of its membership.10 In par-
ticular, it is important to ascertain whether the membership of the collective entity 
and member rights and obligations change when it decides to spatially reposition 
some of its human capital. Similarly, it is important to ascertain who the principals 
and agents of these decisions are, what quasi-contractual terms are agreed by the 
parties to govern capital-cum-member relocation, and what mechanisms could be 
10 For example, even when, initially, all members of the collective entity are equal and share equally its 
joint income, the size of membership may change when a member is dispatched by it to work at a foreign 
destination. In some cases (e.g., in a closely-knit family), the migrant may retain full membership rights, 
pool its outside earnings with the rest of the entity and share pro rata the joint income and wealth. In 
other cases, however, they may drop out and lose some or all of their membership rights. Also, it may be 
in the interests of the remaining members of the entity to alter the size of membership through member 
migration. For example, when the entity prospers, there may be an incentive to reduce its membership, 
so that the remaining members could enjoy larger per person returns. Similarly, poor returns at home 
location may induce the entity to keep its outsourced members closed bonded to attract remittances and 
other assistance.
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used to enforce such quasi-contracts if necessary. The NELM is often ambiguous 
about the impact of the spatial mobility-immobility of members of collective entities 
on the latter’s size, structure and terms of governance.11
The diversity of capital assets, value expectancy 
and migration intentions
Social and public capital
To date, the two most influential areas of social science concerned with people’s 
mobility and immobility have been economics and sociology. The neoclassical econom-
ics approach to migration has often been criticised for its oversight of non-economic 
factors, which are likely to influence people’s mobility decisions (Arango, 2000: 287). 
While the economic literature has emphasised differentials in income and earnings, 
movement costs, and jurisdictional entry barriers as drivers or impedants of human 
capital mobility, the sociological literature has focused on the role of expectations, 
social trust, reciprocity motives and incentives in mobility decisions (Bourdieu, 1986 
and 2006; Coleman, 1990; Harbison, 1981; Sanders and Nee, 1996; De Jong, 2000; 
Vallejo and Keister, 2019).12 The two perspectives differ in one notable respect. The 
strictly economic approach is ultimately concerned with the mechanics, efficiency 
and effectiveness of resource allocation and uses, i.e. the process of wealth creation. 
The sociological approach is mostly focused on how this wealth is utilised to achieve 
various social objectives in the formation and sustainment of different social struc-
tures and in the conduct of human affairs generally.
11 These matters are addressed explicitly by the economic club literature, although most of it is not 
directly concerned with the spatial mobility of human capital (for a survey see Sandler and Tschirhart, 
1980). The size and objectives of the club are critical to the choice of its operating rules. For example, if 
a particular collective entity operates as the Buchanan-style economic club (Buchanan, 1965), its ‘man-
agement’ (say senior family members) should maximise the average (per member) utility rather than 
the total utility of all members. Equations (5) and (6) have to be modified accordingly. They should also 
reflect the principal-agent structure of the collective entity as it is the principal who drives and enforces 
spatial relocation decisions, specifies the wealth sharing rules, and refracts the membership utility through 
its own utility function.
12 The sociology of migration literature has also examined the nexus between various forms of cap-
ital formation and migration through the prism of Bourdieu’s theory of capital (Bourdieu, 1985, 1986, 
2006; Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992) and Coleman’s theory of social capital (Coleman, 1990). Following 
Bourdieu, four forms of capital can be distinguished: economic (income, wealth, financial and physical 
assets), social (social networks, group membership), cultural (embodied in people as literacy, institution-
alised in the form of formal educational attainments, and objectified as cultural goods), and symbolic 
(e.g., honour, prestige, social standing). For an extensive review of most recent literature see Vallejo and 
Keister (2019).
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By and large, the extant economic literature has shown limited interest in the 
diversity of capital forms, which could be used to explain human spatial mobility 
and immobility. A notable exception is the literature focused on social capital as 
a complementary resource enhancing the value of human capital endowments.13 This 
draws on the embeddedness approach in economic sociology: family and kinship 
ties make it easier to realise the potential inherent in people’s human capital endow-
ments as they enhance the range of employment and social opportunities, including 
migration, and increase the likelihood of effective capital utilisation (Haug, 2008).14 
Similar benefits may be realised through access to social networks (complementary 
social capital) accessible at different locations, which facilitate information flows and 
provide access to employment and residential opportunities, operate as quasi-markets 
restricted to network members, and as conduits for community welfare support. They 
are often responsible for chain migration in that the costs and risks associated with 
people’s mobility decline as successive cohorts follow the lead of early movers (e.g., 
Da Vanzo, 1981; Taylor, 1986; Massey and García Espana, 1987; Borjas, 1992; Portes, 
1995; De Jong et al., 1996). As a result, the migration of people from a particular 
source jurisdiction or ethnic background becomes cumulative and self-sustained. 
However, the self-perpetuating (snowballing) dynamics of cumulative migration 
also depends on whether each new quantum of capital contributed by successive 
migrants can effectively be added to the existing stock and absorbed at the host 
location (Harrington, 2005).15
Ultimately, the spatial mobility of the oeconomicos is often influenced by the 
availability of complementary bundles of goods and services at different destinations, 
i.e. access to different amenities, public goods and non-tradeables such as law and 
order and political systems that guarantee specific individual freedoms (Graves, 1983; 
Roback, 1988; Greenwood, 1997; Shields and Shields, 1989). Thus, public investment 
13 The remittance literature has also focused on social remittances, i.e. international transfers of norms, 
practices, identities, and social capital (Levitt, 1998, 2001, 2007). Arguably, the term ‘social remittances’ is 
a misnomer as transfers of social capital occur in both directions with both home and host destinations 
benefiting from (or being disadvantaged by) such flows. That said, the social remittance literature remains 
rather vague as to how the accumulation of social capital by economic agents impacts their subsequent 
mobility as migrants and the opportunity to integrate into the host community.
14 The concept of ‘social capital’ can be defined narrowly as a network of connections (often used in 
empirical works, e.g. Boxman et al., 1991: 52) or broadly as the generalised trust in and positive attitudes 
towards others (e.g., Inglehart, 1997: 188).
15 To the homo economicus, these social networks are social capital assets, which provide returns on 
investments in network membership. However, the initial network-related benefits may also decline or 
become negative over time if and when migrants get locked into their family and ethnic networks and the 
value of their human capital decreases as they become excessively dependent on their network access and, 
as a result, less socially and spatially adaptable and mobile. This is an obvious moral hazard of assistance 
provided through kinship and community ties.
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in amenities and collective goods may attract economic agents seeking complementary 
public capital to enhance the value of their individual human capital endowments. As 
access to such location-specific public capital is financed by taxation, the oeconomico 
must also factor in the location-specific tax burden. This is the essence of the Tie-
bout hypothesis, which asserts that jurisdictions compete for settlers differentiating 
amenity-tax packages and potential residents non-randomly disperse between them 
as they seek locations that best match their amenity-tax preferences (Tiebout, 1956).
We can now include different forms of capital accessible at different locations 
net of costs of accessing them by the agent concerned in the cost-benefit equation 
(5). Again, the representative agent evaluates locations F and H, where F, H ∈ Φ0, 
to maximize the expected net gain from a potential change of location, taking into 

















−CFH0 d ,  X( ) (7)
 U F( )  =  U µFS ,  µFP ,U jF ,  pF ,RF ,CF ,  T ,  i,  CFH0( ),     F∈ φ0 , (8)
where the location-specific multipliers reflect the expected availability of net ben-
efits associated with access to social capital, µFS and public capital, µFP, at locations 
F, H ∈ Φ0, where µΦΚ ≥ 0 and K are different categories of capital so that S, P ∈ Κ. 
The multipliers may also reflect particular attributes of the oeconomico, for example, 
some agents are keen on access to social networks or public goods and, thus, they 
impute higher weightings to locations offering greater availability of their preferred 
category of capital assets.
When µFΦΚ = 0 the multiplier effect of a particular category of location-specific 
capital K is expected to be nil, making the location unattractive. When 0 < µΦΚ < 1, 
the multiplier concerned has a wealth depleting effect, for example, access to social 
capital such as ethnic networks may, in the long run, decrease the agent’s ability 
to make effective use of their human capital. Similarly, access to certain public goods 
may be ‘addictive’ and impact negatively on the agent’s long-run ability to make good 
use of their human capital endowments. Also, certain types of cultural capital may 
produce negative, wealth diminishing ‘lock-in’ effects in the long run. Positive mul-
tiplier effects occur when 1 < µΦΚ. When maxF, H∈Φ0
E(ΠFH )> 0  the agent may move to 
location FmaxΠ otherwise they would remain at H.
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Value expectancy, asset portfolios and migration intentions
Thus far, we have largely focused on human capital assets, as migration of peo-
ple is strictly complementary to the spatial mobility of their human capital. Other 
forms of capital have been limited to social and public capital endowments specific 
to different locations that are formed by host communities and may benefit those 
who move there. However, there are also assets that can be privately acquired and 
owned by the oeconomico. The two most obvious categories of such assets are physical 
capital (e.g., real estate, chattels) and financial capital (e.g., cash, bank deposits, and 
shares). In contrast to human capital, these assets need not move across the activity 
space together with their owners. Some are spatially immobile (e.g., real estate) but 
can be owned remotely by spatially mobile oeconomicos, others (e.g. financial capital 
assets) are portable and can be relocated between jurisdictions with or independently 
of their owners. Ceteris paribus, individuals who accumulate relatively liquid and 
portable forms of capital are likely to be more footloose than those encumbered by 
the ownership of physically immobile assets that require owners’ direct involvement.
An attempt to consolidate considerations of human, social and other forms of 
capital into an integrated decision model was made by De Jong and Gardner (1981) 
and De Jong and Fawcett (1981). Their (rational) value expectancy (VE) approach 
to migration intentions is a variant of the expected value model in which the oeco-
nomico evaluates the relative attractiveness of alternative destinations, including 
their current place of residence, “in terms of the individually valued goals that might 
be met by moving (or staying) and the perceived linkage, in terms of expectancy, 
between migration behaviour and the attainment of these goals in alternative loca-
tions including the current place of residence” (De Jong et al., 1983: 473). In this 
approach, oeconomicos maximise the sum of expected utilities for each accessible 
location over several decisional dimensions such as wealth, status, comfort, autonomy, 
and affiliation (Haug, 2008). The value attributed to each dimension is determined 
by (subjective) individual characteristics of the decision maker, social and cultural 
norms, personality factors such as adaptability or risk preferences, and the structure 
of available opportunities. The agent selects the preferred or intended destination as 
the one that offers the highest expected locational value. Thus, the “decision making 
theory is explicitly directed toward explaining migration intentions as an intermediate 
step to actual behaviour” (De Jong et al. 1983: 471).
The parallels between the VE approach and the methodology used in the economic 
cost-benefit analysis (CBA) are apparent and much of the criticism that has been 
directed at the latter may also apply to the VE approach. Similar problems arise when 
the conventional portfolio-theoretic (PT) approach is adopted to determine both the 
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preferred asset-structure of the oeconomico’s portfolio and the preferred location of 
different assets comprising it, particularly the location of the agent’s human capital.16 
The PT approach has been used by the NELM (see Stark, 1991, 2009; Dustmann, 1997). 
However, the use of such models to determine human migration intentions is rather 
difficult, given the complexity of asset ownership and location and the often-obscure 
decision-making structures. Moreover, like many other portfolio-theoretic approaches, 
the application of PT methodology to determine human migration decisions often 
ignores “the important qualitative and quantitative implications of the interaction 
between irreversibility, uncertainty and the choice of timing” in resource allocation 
decisions (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994: 6). In this respect, Dustmann and Görlach (2016) 
are a notable exception.
Nevertheless, the VE approach offers a framework for the assessment of changes 
in the expected value of an oeconomico’s portfolio of assets associated with the con-
templated move from their current residence, H, to another location, F. Generally, 
an agent’s migration decision should be predicated on the expected distribution of 
all gains and losses from the spatial relocation of the asset owner and the associated 
relocation and revaluation of all assets comprising the owner’s portfolio (Da Vanzo, 
1981; Haug, 2008). This is implicit in our cost-benefit equation (7), which we 
now revisit to re-specify benefit and cost vectors, RF and CF, by incorporating in the 
oeconomico’s portfolio a vector of capital assets, a2 to az, as well as the agent’s human 
capital, a1. Thus,
RF   = Ra1F0 ,  …,  Ra1FT ,  Ra2F0 ,  …,  Ra2FT , RazF0 ,  …,  RazFT( )
CF   = Ca1F0 ,  …,  Ca1FT ,  Ca2F0 ,  …,  Ca2FT , CazF0 ,  …,  CazFT( )
16 The portfolio-theoretic (PT) methodology that has originally been developed by Markowitz (1952 and 
1959) and refined by numerous researchers studying financial investments and the efficiency of financial 
markets (e.g., Hester and Tobin, 1967; Sharpe, 1970; Elton and Gruber, 1997) or the impact of structural 
diversification on risk-return outcomes in other areas such as industrial and regional economics (e.g., 
Conroy, 1975; Barth et al., 1975; Siegel et al., 1995; Chandra, 2002, 2003; Chandra and Shadel, 2007). The 
PT methodology allows asset diversification in investing, i.e., the selection of an asset mix that may lower 
the portfolio’s risk. The PT approach postulates that all risk-return combinations of different portfolios or 
mixes of assets lie within the parabolic frontier of which the upper segment is the efficient frontier, i.e., the 
model predicts the existence of a systematic nonlinear (convex) frontier relationship between returns on 
portfolios/mixes of assets and risks associated with holding these combinations of assets (Chandra, 2003). 
The PT theory has been criticised for its heavy reliance on the assumption of the Gaussian distribution of 
asset returns and the Markowitz parabolic frontier. Other criticisms concern its reliance on the efficient 
market hypothesis (Hubbard, 2009), which postulates that utility maximising market agents have rational 
expectations and that market information is efficiently diffused so that the population of market agents as 
a whole is correct in its judgments and reactions to changing asset prices and quantities, even though no 
one individual investor needs to be completely market savvy; and as new relevant information becomes 
available, it is absorbed by investors who learn and update their expectations accordingly.
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The general shape of utility function appears to be unchanged, although the 
benefit and cost vectors have been assigned a different interpretation:
 U F( )  =  U µFS ,  µFP ,  U jF ,  pF ,RF ,CF ,  T ,  i,  CFH0( ),     F∈φ0  (9)
In practice, this multitude of decisional dimensions, and the associated trade-offs 
may present insurmountable problems for any real-life decision taker.17 Both the VE 
approach and the PT methodology have shown that the development of complex, 
formal models to determine human relocation intentions may be very difficult, 
time-consuming and prohibitively costly. To use such methodologies, the oeconomicos 
would have to determine their own resource endowments within the stipulated time 
horizon, the attendant states of the world that might affect the use of these resources 
and, in this context, define their economic strategies and intentions including the 
potential for spatial relocation of their human capital and other portable components 
of their wealth. As Kogut and Kulatilaka (2001: 745) observe, “The dimensional prob-
lem of identifying all these elements and understanding their interactions quickly 
defies a declarative analysis (i.e. net present value) or an exhaustive procedural search 
across all combinations”. Moreover, if the investment experience of business firms 
is to be drawn on, it is often doubtful that the application of sophisticated analytic 
methods produces significantly better investment and locational outcomes than 
back-of-the-envelope calculations and intuitive problem-solving (Bowman, 1963). 
The vast majority of people faced with such choices “must simplify complexity in the 
face of uncertainty” (Williams and Baláž, 2011: 170) by applying heuristics or relying 
on hunches and imitative behaviour.
Optionalising migration intentions
Normally, a rational response to informational voids and asymmetries is to avoid 
the premature declaration of intended future activity and postpone both the decla-
ration and its implementation until the most likely state of the world becomes more 
apparent. Thus, the intention to relocate resources and to migrate may be deferred 
until such time when more accurate information becomes available and the true 
characteristics of different destinations and activities are revealed. Consequently, 
a decision to migrate or to remain in situ may be framed as a string of real options 
17 Even a simple solution such as the sum of expected utilities presupposes the additivity of utilities 
derived from different components of the oeconomico’s wealth (Haug, 2008). We, therefore, leave the 
aggregation function unspecified as it is not critical for the following discussion.
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related to particular states of the world and restricted to specific timeframes, and 
only exercised if and when opportune conditions materialise. Otherwise, each option 
would be allowed to lapse.
This evolving decision-making approach may sometimes take several steps and 
a sequence of options: at each step, as more information becomes available, the corre-
sponding mobility option is either exercised or allowed to lapse. Each step, however, 
may also require a resource outlay to explore the evolving problem-solution spaces. 
Thus, it has to be determined at each step if the value of flexibility offered by the next 
option justifies its cost. Flexibility comes at a price and options must be ‘purchased’ 
so that an option’s cost has to be offset by the expected benefit of loss avoidance.18 In 
addition, the momentum of resource allocation may sometimes be lost when an early 
commitment to action is postponed. Nevertheless, the expected value of regrets from 
taking a wrong decision prematurely often far outweighs the cost of postponement.
The real options approach, defined as “the investment in physical and human 
assets that provides the opportunity to respond to future contingent events” (Kogut 
and Kulatilaka, 2001: 745), allows the oeconomico to “proactively exploit risk rather 
than just absorb it” (ibid). It offers an intuitively attractive way of modelling the 
cautious behaviour of risk-averse economic agents.19 However, to be able to apply 
the real options methodology the oeconomico must be able to identify the source of 
uncertainty as well as retain their decision-making discretion to exercise valuable 
options at the appropriate time and let other options lapse. Thus, their investment 
choices must also involve sunk (irretrievable) cost components described by Kogut 
and Kulatilaka as ‘irreversibility’ (or the ‘arrow of time’), i.e. an option has value 
only if knowledge is limited and investment decisions, such as spatial mobility of 
resources, cannot be reversed costlessly.
In the migration literature, the real options approach has been pioneered by Burda 
(1993 and 1995) who showed that the value of postponement (an option to move 
to be exercised at a later date) could be a function of the expected (real) income gap 
between home and target destination as well as the expected cost of the contemplated 
move. In a more recent application of the real options approach, Roberts and Morris 
(2003) showed how an option to migrate could reduce the variance (risk) of the overall 
household income. Tabor (2010) shows that people often segment their migration 
18 Option valuation may be a problem as models such as the Black-Scholes model, used to value 
(financial) options traded at stock exchanges may not be applicable. For the latter, the current and future 
stock prices underlying option values are directly observable and can be used by the option holder to 
realise the profit or to cut the loss. For real strategic options the analogous price information may not be 
available (Bowman and Moskowitz, 2001).
19 The opposite would apply to risk-loving agents who would normally prefer a chance to gamble 
their resources on an all-or-nothing venture to a more cautious gradual approach.
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decisions into stages (i.e. pre-contemplation, contemplation, action, acculturation) 
and simplify complexities into yes/no decision frameworks. This is another way of 
optionalising the spatial allocation of resources, although it differs from the real 
options approach in that the options are not precisely valued.
Clearly, the use of rigorous option valuation methodology would present over-
whelming technical challenges for a vast majority of people. Nevertheless, there is 
value to be realised by following an intuitive, step-by-step approach in most resource 
allocation decisions. But even the intuitive approach requires the agent concerned 
to be ready to make an initial effort to understand the source of uncertainty, thus, 
what might be gained by postponing the final decision and by making stepwise 
decisions contingent on particular states of the world being revealed. They must 
also be sufficiently confident in their capacity to exercise or reject an option at each 
decision point. Only in such a case the ‘buying’ of a real option makes sense. How-
ever, a strongly risk-averse individual may also be averse to invest in learning and 
postponement, since it is also lost if the idea to migrate is abandoned. That is many 
people are likely to be averse to taking any risky opportunities to move or to change 
the status quo, regardless of whether it is a one-shot choice or a sequence of decision 
steps requiring a small initial investment. Such attitudes may have a cumulative 
effect on the preference to stay. On the other hand, even risk-averse individuals may 
move when others move and the bandwagon is large enough to jump on it or when 
circumstances beyond their control force them to relocate.
***
At the outset of this paper, we asked why, notwithstanding the current publicity 
surrendering international migration, only a relatively small proportion of the global 
population has actually migrated between countries. The predictable response has 
been that it was the border controls that have prevented mass migrations. But this is 
only part of the explanation. In economically diverse regions such as the EU, acces-
sion of new member states have been followed by migration surges. But once the 
post-accession dust has settled, the long-term rate of relocation declines and stabi-
lises, as factors other than income/wealth differentials come into play. Over the past 
two decades, migration studies have made considerable progress towards enhanced 
understanding of the complexity of migration processes and the multitude of factors 
that influence people’s spatial mobility, immobility and settlement behaviour. How-
ever, much of this enhanced understanding has been fragmented between multiple 
theories separated from each other by their specialist focus and disciplinary silos. 
This paper attempts to provide an eclectic, meta-theoretical perspective on economic 
drivers of international mobility and immobility of human capital and, thus, spatial 
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choices of people in whom this capital is embedded. These issues have been addressed 
by economists over a long period of time (for a discussion of issues concerned see, 
for example, Castles, 2010 and 2013) but the associated literature is still fragmented 
and often too technical for non-specialists to follow. In this paper, we have attempted 
to bring some strands of the extant literature together to highlight the sheer complexity 
of migration-related decision-making resulting, inter alia, from diverse and hard-
to-assess characteristics of potential destinations, the inter-temporal dimension of 
such locational choices, informational asymmetries, and the frequent involvement of 
many individuals (e.g., family members, communities) in collective decision making 
processes. In particular, we have been particularly interested in choices that require 
individuals or groups to take into consideration the characteristics of different cap-
ital assets as components of their individual or collective wealth, and the impact of 
their spatial mobility on the location and valuation of these assets. We draw on the 
neoclassical foundations of the economics discipline as “central to building strong 
and coherent theories (of human behaviour) … to maintaining the desirable level 
of normative awareness … and … for consensus-building and adjudication and are 
at the heart of most progress and innovation within the discipline” (Cornut, 2015: 
63). Our eclectic approach aims to provide an overarching framework to link and 
integrate more specific and narrowly focused theories explaining economic causes 
of international location of the human capital.
We have also aimed to show that along the centrifugal forces that disperse people 
between countries, such as income differentials or access to location-specific public 
goods, there are also strong centripetal forces which encourage people to remain in situ. 
The latter have received relatively less attention in the economic literature but there 
are many reasons why many people who are otherwise concerned with their economic 
wellbeing, may prefer to remain in their homeland despite the apparent presence of 
income/wealth differentials between their home location and other accessible desti-
nations. These reasons include sentimental, family and social attachments that bond 
people together and make them wish to stay in close proximity to each other. They 
also include the expected changes in the composition and valuation of their wealth 
so that, for example, welfare gains associated with access to better job opportunities 
elsewhere may be more than offset by the expected welfare loss from the devaluation 
of their accumulated stock of assets (e.g., loss of inheritance) or the restricted access 
to public goods available at the home location (e.g., welfare assistance, health care, 
education). In terms of the decision-making model outlined above, they opt to stay 
put because the value of their capital endowments at the home location exceeds the 
expected net value of capital assets to be realised elsewhere. We have added one fur-
ther reason for immobility, which relates to the complexity and uncertainty inherent 
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in human decisions to relocate across national borders. To simplify the complexity 
of such choices people often apply heuristics or imitate other people’s behaviour. 
Alternatively, they may ‘optionalise’ their decision-making processes to make them 
step-wise and contingent on relevant information being revealed progressively: the 
real options approach. For some people, however, the natural default position, when 
confronted with complex decisions with risky outcomes and costly implications, is 
to avoid them altogether by opting for the status quo.
The expected utility formulation of the decision problem outlined in this paper 
helps to identify the many dimensions that may come into play in people’s relocation 
decisions. However, to explain specific, locational preferences and choices made by 
particular people in particular circumstances, especially those who have not moved 
from their base location, specific theories must be advanced that tailor the above 
eclectic methodology to produce subsets of specific, testable hypotheses. In par-
ticular, it remains to be tested empirically whether the observed immobility of most 
people reflects their considered preference to remain in their homeland as the best of 
available options, or the lack of opportunity to move elsewhere, or a default position 
to remain in situ when spatial relocation choices are too complex and risky to make.
Bibliography
Arango, J. (2000). Explaining Migration: A Critical View. International Social Science Journal, 
52 (165): 283–96.
Barth, J., Kraft, J. Wiest, P. (1975). A Portfolio Theoretic Approach to Industrial Diversification 
and Regional Employment. Journal of Regional Science, 15 (1): 9–15.
Becker, G. (1974). A Theory of Social Interaction. Journal of Political Economy, 82.
Becker, G. (1975). Human Capital. 2nd ed. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
Bodvarsson, Ö. B., Van den Berg, H. (2009). The Economics of Immigration: Theory and Policy. 
2nd ed. Berlin: Springer-Verlag.
Borjas, G. J. (1992). Ethnic Capital and Intergenerational Mobility. The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 107 (1): 123–50.
Borjas, G. J. (1989). Economic Theory and International Migration. The International Migration 
Review, 23 (3): 457–485.
Borjas, G. J. (2015). Immigration and Globalization: A Review Essay. Journal of Economic 
Literature, 53 (4): 961–974.
Borjas, G. J. (1987). Self-Selection and Earnings of Immigrants. American Economic Review, 
77 (4): 531–553.
Borjas, G. J. (1991). Immigration and Self-Selection. In: Immigration, Trade and the Labour 
Market. J. Abowd, R. Freeman (Eds.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
56 Barbara Jancewicz, Stefan Markowski 
Studia z Polityki Publicznej
Borjas, G. J. (1994). The Economics of Immigration. Journal of Economic Literature, 32 (4).
Bourdieu, P. (2006). The Forms of Capital. In: Education, Globalisation and Social Change. 
H. Lauder, P. Brown, J. A. Dollabough, A. H. Halsey (Eds.). Oxford: Oxford University 
Press: 105–119.
Bourdieu, P. (2006). The Forms of Capital. In: Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology 
of Education. J. G. Richardson (Ed.). New York: Greenwood.
Bourdieu, P. (1985). Social Space and the Genesis of Groups. Theory and Society, 16 (6).
Bourdieu, P., Wacquant, L. J. D. (1992). An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology. Cambridge: Polity.
Bowman, E. H. (1963). Consistency and Optimality in Managerial Decision Making. Management 
Science, 9.
Bowman, E. H., Moskowitz, G. T. (2001). Real Options Analysis and Strategic Decision Making. 
Organization Science, 12 (6).
Boxman, E. A. W., De Graaf, P. M., Flap, H. D. (1991). The Impact of Social and Human Capital 
on the Income Attainment of Dutch Managers. Social Networks, 13: 51–73.
Buchanan, J. M. (1965). An Economic Theory of Clubs. Economica, 32 (125): 1.
Burda, M. C. (1993). The Determinants of East-West German Migration. European Economic 
Review, 37.
Burda, M. C. (1995). Migration and the Option Value of Waiting. Economic and Social Review, 
27 (1): 1–19.
Castles, S. (2010). Understanding Global Migration: A Social Transformation Perspective. 
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 36 (10): 1565–1586.
Castles, S. (2013). The Forces Driving Global Migration. Journal of Intercultural Studies, 
34 (2): 122–140.
Chandra, S. (2002). A Test of the Regional Growth-Instability Frontier Using State Data. Land 
Economics, 78 (3): 442–62.
Chandra, S. (2003). Regional Economy Size and the Growth-Instability Frontier: Evidence 
from Europe. Journal of Regional Science, 43 (1): 95–122.
Chandra, S., Shadel W. G. (2007). Crossing Disciplinary Boundaries: Applying Financial Portfolio 
Theory to Model the Organization of the Self-Concept. Journal of Research in Personality, 
41 (2): 346–73.
Chen, K. P., Chiang, S. H. (1998). Migration as Portfolio Selection. York: Mimeo.
Clark, X., Hatton, T. J., Williamson, J. G. (2007). Explaining U. S. Immigration, 1971–1998. 
Review of Economics and Statistics, 89 (2): 359–73.
Clemens, M. A. (2011). Economics and Emigration: Trillion-Dollar Bills on the Sidewalk? 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 25 (3): 83–106.
Coleman, J. S. (1990). The Foundations of Social Theory. Cambridge, MA: Belknap of Harvard UP.
Conroy, M. (1975). Regional Economic Diversification. New York: Praeger.
Constant, A. F., Zimmermann, K. F. (2013). International Handbook on the Economics of 
Migration. Edward Elgar Publishing.
57Wealth formation by economic agents and their international mobility...
nr 4(24)2019
Corden, W. M., Findlay, R. (1975). Urban Unemployment, Intersectoral Capital Mobility and 
Development Policy. Economica, 42 (165): 59–78.
Cornut, J. (2015). Analytic Eclecticism in Practice: A Method for Combining International 
Relations Theories. International Studies Perspectives, 16 (1): 50–66.
Cox, D., Eser, Z., Jimenez, E. (1998). Motives for Private Transfers over the Life Cycle: An 
Analytical Framework and Evidence for Peru. Journal of Development Economics, 55 (1): 57–80.
Cox, D., Jimenez, E. (1992). Social Security and Private Transfers in Developing Countries: 
The Case of Peru. World Bank Economic Review, 6 (1): 155–69.
Da Vanzo, J. S. (1981). Microeconomic Approaches to Studying Migration Decisions. In: 
Migration Decision Making: Multidisciplinary Approaches to Microlevel Studies in Developed 
and Developing Countries. G. F. De Jong, R. W. Gardner (Eds.). New York: Pergamon Press.
Dasgupta, P. (1990). Well-Being and the Extent of Its Realisation in Poor Countries. The 
Economic Journal, 100 (400): 1–32.
De Jong, G. F., Abad, R. G., Arnold, F., Carino, B. V., Fawcett, J. T. (1983). International and 
Internal Migration Decision Making: A Value-Expectancy Based Analytical Framework of 
Intentions to Move from a Rural Philippine Province. International Migration Review, 17 (3).
De Jong, G. F., Fawcett, J. T. (1981). Motivations for Migration: An Assessment and a Value-
Expectancy Research Model. In Migration Decision Making: Multidisciplinary Approaches 
to Microlevel Studies in Developed and Developing Countries. New York: Pergamon Press.
De Jong, G. F., Johnson. A. G., Richter. K. (1996). Determinants of Migration Values and 
Expectations in Rural Thailand. Asian and Pacific Migration Journal, 5 (4): 399–416.
De Jong, G. F. (2000). Expectations, Gender and Norms in Migration Decision Making. 
Population Studies, 54 (3): 307–19.
De Jong, G. F., Gardner. R. W. (Eds.) (1981). Migration Decision Making. Multidisciplinary 
Approaches to Microlevel Studies in Developed and Developing Countries. New York: 
Pergamon Press.
Dixit, A., Pindyck, S. (1994). Investment Under Uncertainty. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Dustmann, C. (1997). Return Migration, Uncertainty and Precautionary Savings. Journal of 
Development Economics, 52 (2): 295–316.
Dustmann, C. Görlach, J.-S. (2016). The Economics of Temporary Migrations. Journal of 
Economic Literature, 54 (1): 98–136.
Elton, E. J., Gruber, M. J. (1997). Modern Portfolio Theory, 1950 to Date. Journal of Banking 
and Finance.
Foster, A. D., Rosenzweig, M. R. (2001). Imperfect Commitment, Altruism, and the Family: 
Evidence from Transfer Behavior in Low-Income Rural Areas. Review of Economics and 
Statistics, 83 (3): 389–407.
Graves, P. E. (1983). Migration with a Composite Amenity: The Role of Rents. Journal of Regional 
Science, 23 (4): 541–46.
Greenwood, M. J. (1997). Internal Migration in Developed Countries. In: Handbook of Population 
and Family Economics. M. Rosenzweig, O. Stark (Eds.). Amsterdam: Elsevier.
58 Barbara Jancewicz, Stefan Markowski 
Studia z Polityki Publicznej
Harbison, S. F. (1981). Family Structure and Family Strategy in Migration Decision Making. In: 
Migration Decision Making, Multidisciplinary Approaches to Microlevel Studies in Developed 
and Developing Countries. G. F. De Jong, R. W. Gardner (Eds.). New York: Pergamon 
Press: 225–51.
Harrington, A. (2005). Modern Social Theory: An Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Harris, J., Todaro, M. (1970). Migration, Unemployment and Development: A Two-Sector 
Analysis. American Economic Review, 60.
Hatton, T. J., Williamson, J. G. (2005). What Fundamentals Drive World Migration? In: Poverty, 
International Migration and Asylum. G. Borjas, J. Crisp (Eds.). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Haug, S. (2008). Migration Networks and Migration Decision-Making. Journal of Ethnic and 
Migration Studies, 34 (4): 585–605.
Hester, D. D., Tobin, J. (1967). Risk Aversion and Portfolio Choice 19. New York: John Wiley.
Hicks, J. (1932). The Theory of Wages. London: Macmillan.
Inglehart, R. (1997). Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic and Political 
Change in 43 Societies. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Kennan, J., Walker, J. R. (2011). The Effect of Expected Income on Individual Migration 
Decisions. Econometrica, 79 (1).
Kogut, B., Kulatilaka, N. (2001). Capabilities as Real Options. Organization Science, 12 (6): 744–58.
Levitt, P. (2007). God Needs No Passport. New York: The New Press.
Levitt, P. (2001). The Transnational Villagers. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 
California Press.
Levitt, P. (1998). Social Remittances: Migration Driven Local-Level Forms of Cultural Diffusion. 
International Migration Review, 32 (4): 926.
Markowitz, H M. (1959). Portfolio Selection: Efficient Diversification of Investments. New York: 
John Wiley.
Markowitz, H. M. (1952). Portfolio Selections. Journal of Finance, 7.
Massey, D. S., García España, F. (1987). The Social Process of International Migration. Science, 
237: 733–38.
Massey, D., Arango, J., Hugo, G., Kouaouci, A., Pellegrino, A., Taylor, J. E. (2008). Worlds 
in Motion: Understanding International Migration at the End of the Millennium. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press.
Massey, D., Arango, J., Hugo, G., Kouaouci, A., Pellegrino A., Taylor, J. E. (1993). Theories of 
International Migration: A Review and Appraisal. Population and Development Review, 
19 (3): 431–66.
McCall, B. P., McCall, J. J. (1987). A Sequential Study of Migration and Job Search. Journal of 
Labor Economics, 5 (4): 452–76.
Mincer, J. (1978). Family Migration Decisions. Journal of Political Economy, 86 (5): 749–73.
OECD (2017). International Migration Outlook 2017. Paris: OECD Publishing.
OECD (2019). International Migration Outlook 2019. Paris: OECD Publishing.
59Wealth formation by economic agents and their international mobility...
nr 4(24)2019
Olson, M. (1996). Big Bills Left on the Sidewalk: Why Some National Are Rich and Others 
Poor. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10 (2): 3–24.
Pickles, A, Rogerson, P. (1984). Wage Distribution and Spatial Preferences in Competitive Job 
Search and Migration. Regional Science, 18.
Poirine, B. (1997). A Theory of Remittances as an Implicit Family Loan Arrangement. World 
Development, 25 (4): 589–611.
Polachek, S. W., Horvath, F. W. (2012). A Life Cycle Approach to Migration: Analysis of the 
Perspicacious Peregrinator. In: Research in Labor Economics (35th Anniversary Retrospective). 
S. W. Polachek, K. Tatsiramos (Eds.). Emerald Group Publishing Limited: 349–95.
Portes, A. (1995). The Economic Sociology of Immigration. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Rapoport, H., Docquier, F. (2006). The Economics of Migrants’ Remittances. In: Handbook of 
the Economics of Giving, Altruism and Reciprocity. S. C. Kolm, J. M. Ythier (Eds.) Amsterdam: 
North Holland: 1135–1198.
Roback, J. (1988). Wages, Rents, and Amenities: Differences Among Workers and Regions. 
Economic Inquiry, 26 (1): 23–41.
Roberts, K. D., Morris, M. D. S. (2003). Fortune, Risk, and Remittances: An Application of Option 
Theory to Participation in Village-Based Migration Networks. Source: The International 
Migration Review, 37 (4): 1252–81.
Rosenzweig, M. (1988). Risk, Implicit Contracts and the Family in Rural Areas of Low-Income 
Countries. Economic Journal, 393 (98).
Rosenzweig, M., Stark, O. (1989). Consumption Smoothing, Migration, and Marriage: Evidence 
from Rural India. Journal of Political Economy, 97 (4): 905–926.
Sanders, J. M., Nee, V. (1996). Immigrant Self-Employment: The Family as Social Capital and 
the Value of Human Capital. American Sociological Review, 61 (2).
Sandler, T., Tschirhart, J. T. (1980). The Economic Theory of Clubs: An Evaluation Survey. 
Journal of Economic Literature, 18 (4).
Sharpe, W. F. (1970). Portfolio Theory and Capital Markets. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Shields, G. M., Shields, M. P. (1989). The Emergence of Migration Theory and a Suggested New 
Direction. Journal of Economic Surveys, 3 (4): 277–304.
Siegel, P. B., Johnson, T. G., Alwang, J. (1995). A Structural Decomposition of Regional Economic 
Instability: A Conceptual Framework. Journal of Regional Science, 35.
Simon, H. A. (2008). Rationality, Bounded. In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. 
S. N. Durlauf, E. L. Blume (Eds.), 2nd ed. Palgrave Macmillan.
Sjaastad, L. A. (1962). The Costs and Returns of Human Migration. Journal of Political Economy, 
70 (5): 80–93.
Solimano, A. (2010). International Migration in the Age of Crisis and Globalization. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Stark, O. (1991). The Migration of Labour. Oxford: Blackwell.
Stark, O. (2009). Reasons for Remitting. World Economics, 10 (3).
60 Barbara Jancewicz, Stefan Markowski 
Studia z Polityki Publicznej
Stark, O., Bloom, D. E. (1985). The New Economics of Labour Migration. The American 
Economic Review, 75.
Stark, O., Levhari, D. (1982). On Migration and Risk in LDCs. In Economic Development and 
Cultural Change, 31: 191–96.
Tabor, A. S. (2010). A Framework of Voluntary Migration: Understanding Modern British Migration 
to New Zealand. (Unpublished doctoral thesis) University of Wellington.
Taylor, J. (1986). Differential Migration, Networks, Information and Risk. In: Research in Human 
Capital and Development. O. Stark (Ed.). Vol. 4. Greenwich CN: JAI Press.
Tiebout, C. (1956). A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures. Journal of Political Economy, 64 (5).
Todaro, M. (1969). A Model of Labour Migration and Urban Unemployment in Less Developed 
Countries. American Economic Review, 59.
UN (2015). World Population Prospect: The 2015 Revision Key Findings and Advance Tables. 
New York: United Nations.
UN (2016). International Migration Report 2015: Highlights. New York: United Nations.
Vallejo, J. A., Keister, L. A. (2019). Immigrants and wealth attainment: migration, inequality, and 
integration. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies. DOI: 10.1080/1369183X.2019.1592872
Weintraub, E. R. (2007). Neoclassical Economics. The Concise Encyclopaedia of Economics. http://
www.econlib.org/library/Enc1/NeoclassicalEconomics.html
Williams, A. M., Baláž, V. (2011). Migration, Risk, and Uncertainty. Population, Space, Place, 18.
Zimmermann, K. F., Bauer, T. (2002). The Economics of Migration. Edward Elgar Publishing.
